11 research outputs found
Automatic analysis of distance bounding protocols
Distance bounding protocols are used by nodes in wireless networks to
calculate upper bounds on their distances to other nodes. However, dishonest
nodes in the network can turn the calculations both illegitimate and inaccurate
when they participate in protocol executions. It is important to analyze
protocols for the possibility of such violations. Past efforts to analyze
distance bounding protocols have only been manual. However, automated
approaches are important since they are quite likely to find flaws that manual
approaches cannot, as witnessed in literature for analysis pertaining to key
establishment protocols. In this paper, we use the constraint solver tool to
automatically analyze distance bounding protocols. We first formulate a new
trace property called Secure Distance Bounding (SDB) that protocol executions
must satisfy. We then classify the scenarios in which these protocols can
operate considering the (dis)honesty of nodes and location of the attacker in
the network. Finally, we extend the constraint solver so that it can be used to
test protocols for violations of SDB in these scenarios and illustrate our
technique on some published protocols.Comment: 22 pages, Appeared in Foundations of Computer Security, (Affiliated
workshop of LICS 2009, Los Angeles, CA)
Experiences and lessons learned in the design and implementation of an Information Assurance curriculum
In 2004, Dakota State University proposed a model for information assurance and computer security program development. That model provided a framework for developing undergraduate and graduate programs at DSU. This paper provides insight into experiences and lessons learned to further implement that model. The paper details modifications to both the undergraduate and graduate information assurance programs as a result of specific issues and challenges. Further, the paper highlights the introduction of a new terminal degree that includes an information assurance specialization. As a national center of excellence in information assurance education, we are confident that this paper will be helpful to universities around the world in either developing new or improving existing IA programs
Guess what? Here is a new tool that finds some new guessing attacks
If a protocol is implemented using a poor password, then the password can be guessed and verified from the messages in the protocol run. This is termed as a guessing attack. Published design and analysis efforts always lacked a general definition for guessing attacks. Further, they never considered possible type-flaws in the protocol runs or using messages from other protocols. In this paper, we provide a simple and general definition for guessing attacks. We explain how we implemented our definition in a tool based on constraint solving. Finally, we demonstrate some new guessing attacks that use type-flaws and multiple protocols which we found using our tool
How to prevent type-flaw attacks on security protocols under algebraic properties
16 pages, Appeared in proceedings of Security with Rewriting Techniques (SecRet09), Affiliated to CSF Symposium 2009, Port Jefferson, NY.Type-flaw attacks upon security protocols wherein agents are led to misinterpret message types have been reported frequently in the literature. Preventing them is crucial for protocol security and verification. Heather et al. proved that tagging every message field with it's type prevents all type-flaw attacks under a free message algebra and perfect encryption system. In this paper, we prove that type-flaw attacks can be prevented with the same technique even under the ACUN algebraic properties of XOR which is commonly used in "real-world" protocols such as SSL 3.0. Our proof method is general and can be easily extended to other monoidal operators that possess properties such as Inverse and Idempotence as well. We also discuss how tagging could be used to prevent type-flaw attacks under other properties such as associativity of pairing, commutative encryption, prefix property and homomorphic encryption
What are Multi-Protocol Guessing Attacks ∗ And How to prevent them
A guessing attack on a security protocol is an attack where an attacker guesses a poorly chosen secret (usually a low-entropy user password) and then seeks to verify that guess using other information. Past efforts to address guessing attacks in terms of design or analysis considered only protocols executed in isolation. However, security protocols are rarely executed in isolation and reality is always a case of mixed-protocols. In this paper, we introduce new types of attacks called multiprotocol guessing attacks, which can exist when protocols are mixed. We then develop a systematic procedure to analyze protocols subject to guessing attacks. Using this procedure, we will present a method of deriving some syntactic conditions to be followed in order for a protocol to be secure against multi-protocol guessing attacks. Lastly, we use the strand space framework to prove that a protocol will remain secure, given that these conditions are followed, by modeling the conditions within the strand space framework. We illustrate these concepts using the Mellovin and Berritt protocol (EKE) as an example. 1